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ABSTRACT
We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead
line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of
e q u a l  l e n g t h  a n d  w e  s t u d y  t h e  l i m i t  o f  t h e  s u b g a m e  p e r f e c t
equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods goes to
infinity while the dead line is kept fixed. This limit is close to the
Raiffa solution when the time horizon is very short. If the dead line
goes to infinity the limit outcome converges to the time preference
Nash solution. The limit outcome is given an axiomatic
characterization as well.
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We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time
interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods goes to inﬁnity
while the dead line is kept ﬁxed. This limit is close to the Raiﬀa solution when the time
horizon is very short. If the dead line goes to inﬁnity the limit outcome converges to
the time preference Nash solution (Chae 1993). The limit outcome is given an axiomatic
characterization as well.
There are several papers analyzing the problem how the outside alternatives available
to the bargainers aﬀect the outcome of the bargaining game (see e.g. Shaked and Sutton
(1984) and Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986)). These studies show that if impasse
is the best alternative, there is no chance of bargaining break down and the bargaining
possibility remains indeﬁnitely, then the best alternative has no eﬀect. A natural setting
where the best alternative outcome could aﬀect the bargained outcome is the case when
the surplus associated with the bargaining problem vanishes in ﬁnite time and after that
bargainers have to take their best alternatives.
It should be noted that we are not dealing with the issues concerning the ”deadline
eﬀect” (c.f. Fershtman and Seidman 1993; Roth, Murnighan and Schoumaker 1988; Ma
and Manove 1993; Simsek and Yildiz 2008). In this paper ﬁnite horizon and dead line mean
the same thing: the bargaining opportunities vanish in ﬁnite time. An instance for such
dead line is given by a special tax treatment oﬀered up till a certain date. If this is the
case of a tax-break for a corporate merger, then after a certain date, such a break becomes
not applicable for ﬁrms bargaining over the terms of the merger.
It is well known that as the deadline tends to inﬁnity, the subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome of the random oﬀer or alternating oﬀer bargaining game converges to the one of
the corresponding inﬁnite horizon game (Binmore 1985). Moreover this outcome converges
to the Nash bargaining solution as the discount factor goes to one. (All these results are
established in Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore (1987)).
Following Stahl (1972), Sjostrom (1991) analyzed a related model. A ﬁnite time interval
is divided into bargaining periods of equal length. When the number of periods goes to
inﬁnity the limit of bargaining outcomes remains close to the (discrete) Raiﬀa solution
(Raiﬀa 1953, 2002). A simpliﬁed version of this solution for a piecewise linear problems
was discussed in Raiﬀa (1953). An axiomatic foundation for this solution is given in Salonen
(1986). The Raiﬀa solution can be obtained as the limit of the following procedure. In
the beginning, each agent demands his ”ideal point” which is the best outcome for him
satisfying individual rationality constraints. Then the average of these two demands are
given as a reference point, and players make new demands with the constraint that nobody
1gets less than this reference point, and so on. The limit outcome of this procedure is the
Raiﬀa solution1.
Sjostrom (1991) proved that without discounting, the subgame perfect equilibrium out-
comes converge to the Raiﬀa solution as the number of bargaining periods increases without
limit. He showed also that with very little discounting the limit outcome lies very close
to the Raiﬀa solution. Of course with constant non-negligible discounting this result does
not restrain the outcome much and in fact as the dead line goes to inﬁnity, the outcome
converges to the Nash solution. In this paper, we try to reconcile these two observations by
investigating more closely the limiting outcomes for ﬁnite horizon and positive discounting.
In the latter half of the paper, we attempt to axiomatize the obtained limit solution,
in part due to the diversity of the solutions arising from the strategic approach. To our
knowledge, not much eﬀort has been devoted to include the time dimension in the axiomatic
bargaining theory.
The paper is organized in the following way. Notation and some preliminary observa-
tions are presented in Section 2. The main results concerning the strategic model are given
in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the axiomatic approach and Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
A 0-1 normalized bargaining problem is given by a compact and convex set S ⊂ R2
+ that
contains the origin. The Pareto frontier of S, PS, is given by y2 = F(y1) such that
1 = F(0), 0 = F(1), where F is strictly concave, continuous, and decreasing. Further, we
assume that F and F −1 are deﬁned and continuously diﬀerentiable on some open U ⊃ [0,1].
For a splitting-a-dollar problem, F is generated by concave, continuous, strictly increasing
and continuously diﬀerentiable functions u1 and u2 on [0,1] with ui(0) = 0 and ui(1) = 1
(i = 1,2), such that given y1, with y1 = u1(q) for some q ∈ [0,1], F(y1) = u2(1 − q). The





Given a deadline T > 0 and a positive integer m, let T/m = ∆m which is the length of a
period. We count periods backwardly so that m is the ﬁrst round of the bargaining game.
The rules of the sequential bargaining game with a random proposer are as follows. At each
period t Nature chooses a proposer with equal probabilities. The chosen proposer makes
a proposal qt in [0,1], and another player replies by ”Yes” or ”No”. If the reply is ”Yes”,
then the game ends with an outcome described by (t,qt). If the reply is ”No”, then the
1Continuous counter part of this procedure is also proposed by Raiﬀa and discussed in Peters and Van
Damme(1991) (see also Livne(1989)).
2game moves into period t − 1 if t > 0, or ends with payoﬀs (a1,a2) (evaluated at t = 0)
if t = 0. We assume that a = (a1,a2) ∈ S but unlike Sjostrom (1991), a = (0,0) is not
required.
Players maximize discounted expected utilities. The discount rate r > 0 is common to
players with the discount factor δ = δr,m = e−r∆m, which we often call ”δ given r and m”.
Next, we deﬁne the Raiﬀa solution R(S,a) with respect to termination payoﬀs a =















, R(S,a) = limj→∞(zj) and














and similarly for agent 2.
We investigate the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of this game. To deﬁne this
concept, we have to deﬁne strategies ﬁrst. The game starts at period m and players get
their outside alternatives at the end of period 0 if no agreement is reached prior to that.
We deﬁne ﬁrst histories. Let φ
m = ∅, and for n = 0,...,m−1 let φ
n = (it,wt,ρt)m
t=n+1,
where in round t player it is the proposer, wt is the oﬀer made, and ρt = ”No” is the
reply. So φ
n is the history in the beginning of period n before the proposer has been
selected. Then a period n history for the proposer in is (φ
n,in) and a period n history for
the responder is (φ
n,in,wn).
A strategy of player i ∈ {1,2} is a mapping σi that maps each period n history for
proposer i into [0,1] and each period n history for responder i into {”Yes”,”No”}. A
strategy proﬁle (σ1,σ2) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if conditional on each history, σi
is optimal given σj(j  = i). Let us characterize now the equilibrium outcome.
If agent 1 is the proposer at the 0-th period, then he makes an oﬀer F −1(a2). The
corresponding allocation (F −1(a2),a2) is accepted by agent 2. If agent 1 is the responder,
then 2 makes an oﬀer F(a1) which is accepted. This yields the expected payoﬀs, or the



















(F (a1) + a2)
￿
.

































As usual, an immediate agreement obtains and so the subgame perfect equilibrium pay-
oﬀs are then (zm
1 ,zm
2 ), and we would like to investigate their values in the limit as ∆m tends
to 0. We write z(t) for lim{zn(m) : ∆m → 0,n(m)/m → t,t > 0}, provided that the limit
3exists.






















and if zn lies on the frontier, (which is the case for n > 0)
z
n+1 − z
















































e−rT/m￿n, where T/m = ∆m is the length of the time interval between








Note that N∗(S) = (1/2,1/2) and R(S,a) = z0 in this case.
One could replace the diﬀerence equation by a diﬀerential formula, i.e.
Dz


















in the limit. We chose this representation of showing all allocations in each period by
respective current values, because this conforms with the representation given in terms of
diﬀerential equation by Coles and Wright (1998) and also it provides a nice interpretation
that the adjustment is made toward the ”global” Nash solution N∗(S), at a rate propor-
tional to the diﬀerence between the current value and Nash solution. However the present
value representation gives also a nice picture. In this example one sees that the process
jumps from e−rTa to e−rTR(S,a) and from there on it proceeds linearly to z with a direction
of (1/2,1/2).





































n = (1 − δ)(N
∗(S) − z
n) (3)
where N∗ is (a/2,b/2).
3 The limit solution
The way diﬀerential equations were used in Example 1 turns out to be very convenient in
solving the general case as well. In fact Coles and Wright (1998) utilized this approach
in their analysis general random proposer games under non-stationary environments (see
also Coles and Muthoo 2003; McLennan 1988; Binmore 1987). We apply their result to
the case with a jump in the agreement set at the deadline. For a problem with a smooth
Pareto frontier, denote by f the derivative dF(y1)/dy1, y = (y1,y2) ∈ PS,
Here, the relevant ”local” Nash solution becomes a function of y, given by










and hence (2) would become
Dz
n = (1 − δ)(N (z
n) − z
n) (4)
Thus, in general, the adjustment is made toward the local Nash solution at a rate
proportional to the diﬀerence, and along the way, the local Nash solution itself moves
toward the global Nash solution. We call the solution of (4) as the limit solution or the
limit outcome.
Our main result is





r(N1 (z1,F(z1)) − z1)
dt
when R(S,a)  = N∗(S) and if R(S,a) = N∗(S),x = N∗(S).
5Note that if R(S,a) = N∗(S),then Dzn = 0 and we obtain the theorem immediately.
In the case where R(S,a)  = N∗(S), showing that z1 (T) =
R T
0 r(N1 (z (t)) − z1 (t))dt +
R1(S,a) holds is equivalent to prove the theorem. We shall prove this claim in several
steps. We denote by     the absolute sum norm:  x  =
P
i|xi|.
Fix x ∈ S and the Raiﬀa solution R(S,a).
Lemma 1 Given ε > 0, there is ∆ > 0 and n with respect to a such that for ∆ < ∆,
 R(S,a) − z
n  < ε
holds.












(z2 + F (z1))
￿
,




0 = G0 ◦     ◦ G0 | {z }
ν
and G
ν = G ◦     ◦ G | {z }
ν
.
Since G0 and G are continuous, so are Gν
0 , and Gν. As δ tends to 1, G tends to
G0. Therefore Gν
0 (z) tends to Gν (z) given ν and z. Thus given ε > 0, there is ∆m and
n so that  Gν
0 (z) − R(S,a)  < ε/2 and  G
n−1
0 (z) − G
n−1
0 (z)  < ε/2. Since Gn−1(z) =
zn,  R(S,a) − zn  < ε, as desired.
Next, we deﬁne z to be ”ε -close to PS”, if there is y in PS, the Pareto set of S, such
that  y − z  < ε.
Lemma 2 Given ε > 0, there is ∆ so that if ∆ < ∆, then it holds that if zn is ε -close to
PS, then δzn+1 is ε -close to PS.
Proof. Write z for G0 (z) and z′ for zn+1. Also write α for F (z′
1)−z′
1 and β for F −1 (z′
2)−z′
2.
Noting that z′ is ε/2 -close to the frontier if z is ε -close to the frontier.
We have

























(If α = 0 or β = 0, then α/β or β/α should be substitutet by the values of gradients
of F or F −1 at z.) Since F is C1, one can ﬁnd a bound on β/α + α/β, say B. Choosing
appropriate ∆, one can assure that (1 − δ)(2 + B) < ε/2 for each ∆ < ∆.
6For z in S\PS, deﬁne
h(z) =
F (δz1) − δz2
F −1 (δz2) − δz1
.
h is continuous and as z gets close to z′ ∈ PS and ∆ → 0, h(z) converges to F ′(z′), since
F is C1. Given ε′ > 0 (and ε) for suﬃciently small ∆, we have |h(z) − F ′ (z′′)| < ε′ for
each z and z′′ with z′′ ∈ PS and  z − z′′  < ε.
Proof of the Theorem. Now, since Coles and Wright (1998)’s result applies as the
process yields the two outcomes (δzn
1,F (δzn
1)) and (F −1(δzn
2),δzn
2), satisfying the backward
induction formula are ε-close to each other for suﬃciently large n, their result implies the
formula in the theorem.
The solution obtained is located between the Nash and the Raiﬀa solution. A larger T
and a lower r moves the solution toward the Nash solution and a higher ai given aj (i  = j),
shifts the Raiﬀa solution to the advantage of i and hence the solution changes in the same
direction.
Example 2. For some cases, one can compute the solution explicitly. Let u1(w) = wα
and u2(w) = wβ with 0 < α,β ≤ 1 where w is the amount of money in the ”divide-a-dollar”
problem (these functions are not C1 at the boundary, and so a is restricted to the interior
of S). Then




u + F/F ′ =
u1/(α−1)







α/β − (1 + α/β)z
1/α
1






α/β − (1 + α/β)(Ra
1)1/α￿
e−(1+α/β)rT/2￿α
(1 + α/β)α .
A change in the bargaining protocol aﬀects the solution, especially through the change
in the limit solution as T vanishes. A sequential bargaining game with player i having the
last say yields the solution given by the same formula but the lower limit of the integral
replaced by the i -th coordinate of the i’s dictatorial solution instead of that of the Raiﬀa
solution. Under the random proposer protocol with unequal probabilities, the solution
is modiﬁed according to these probabilities. The Raiﬀa solution is changed so that the
speed of adjustment in the integral is modiﬁed, and the local and global Nash solutions are
replaced by the asymmetric Nash solutions with the weights given by these probabilities.
74 The axiomatization
One could view the limit solution as a function of a or e−rTa. This solution satisﬁes
sensitivity properties with respect to the ”threat point” as well as the individual rationality
property with respect to e−rTa. Apparently, IIA property is not met because R(S,a) does
not satisfy it. In the rest of this section, we show an attempt to axiomatize this solution
based on the axiomatization of the discrete Raiﬀa solution by Salonen (1986).
The class of problems we consider is Ψ = {B = (S,a,T,r) | S ⊂ R2
+,a ∈ S,T > 0,r >
0}, where S is a compact and convex subsets such that weakly Pareto optimal elements
are Pareto optimal. Thus the class is slightly larger than the one we worked on earlier,
where in order to utilize Coles and Wright (1998)’s result, we assumed smooth Pareto
frontiers. We extend the deﬁnition of the ”derivative” f of the Pareto boundary function
F by ﬁrst deﬁning f(z1) = F ′(z1) if F is diﬀerentiable at z1. For other values of z1 we
proceed as follows. Denote by D the set of all points z1 at which F is diﬀerentiable. Then
let f(z1) = lim{f(z′
1) | z′
1 ↑ z1,z′
1 ∈ D} if z1 < N∗




if z1 > N∗
1(S); and f(z1) = y such that N(z1,F(z1)) = N∗(S) if z1 = N∗
1(S) (recall that
N(z1,F(z1)) is the local Nash solution at (z1,F(z1)).
For a later use, we denote by Γ the set of pairs (S,a) such that B = (S,a,T,r) ∈ Ψ, for
any r > 0, and T > 0. Extension of our solution to this class is of no problem because the
function representing the Pareto frontier of S is diﬀerentiable a.e., for all (S,a,T,r) ∈ Ψ,
and so the integral deﬁning the solution is still well deﬁned.
A solution ϕ to bargaining problems in Ψ maps each B = (S,a,T,r) ∈ Ψ to an element
of S. We use the Hausdorﬀ metric on compact subsets of R2
+ for emasuring the distance
between bargaining problems. A positive aﬃne transformation (α,β) on R2 with α =
(α1,α2) ∈ R2
++ and β = (β1,β2) ∈ R2 is deﬁned by (α,β)(x) = (α1x1 + β1,α2x2 + β2)
for any x ∈ R2. Denote by (α,β)B = ((α,β)S,(α,β)a,T,r) the resulting problem when a
positive aﬃne transformation (α,β) is applied to a problem B = (S,a,T,r). Consider the
following three basic properties for solutions on Ψ.
Eﬃciency (E). ϕ(B) ∈ PS, for all B ∈ Ψ.
Continuity (Cont). ϕ is continuous with respect to a,T,r, and S, for all B =
(S,a,T,r) ∈ Ψ.
Scale Invariance (SI). ϕ((α,0)B) = (α,0)ϕ(B) for each problem B ∈ Ψ, and for any
positive aﬃne transformation (α,0).
Next we introduce a key decomposition property, called the end phase evaluation prop-




8an end phase evaluation given (S,a) ∈ Ψ, if the limit on the right hand side exists and is
independent of r.
By this concept, we try to pin down the bargaining outcome when there is an inﬁnites-
imally short period of time within which bargainers can exchange oﬀers and counter oﬀers.
This outcome could be diﬀerent from the one with an immediate dead line, i.e., when there
is time for a single oﬀer only. It is quite natural to assume that this outcome is independent
of r, given our continuity assumption. Then the eﬀect of an outside alternative a is totally
captured by this evaluation, because if two problems share the same future outcomes (in
case of no agreement now), then the bargaining outcome to day must be the same. Indeed,
we postulate that the solution would remain the same, if two problems have the same end
phase evaluation given S and r. We formulate this as an independent axiom because it has
a clear interpretation, although later it turns out that it is implied by other axioms.
End Phase Evaluation Property (EPEP). For each (S,a) ∈ Γ, the end phase
evaluation g(S,a) exists and is independent of r. If g(S,a) = g(S,a′), then ϕ(S,a,T,r) =
ϕ(S,a′,T,r).
Note that combined with the earlier properties, g should be a continuous, eﬃcient, and
scale invariant mapping on Ψ.
Next we modify the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom (IIA) to our dynamic
setting.
Time Path IIA (TPIIA). Let B = (S,a,T,r) ∈ Ψ and B′ = (S′,a′,T,r) ∈ Ψ be such
that g(S,a) = g(S′,a′) and S′ ⊂ S. If for any T ′,0 < T ′ ≤ T, ϕ((S,a,T ′,r)) ∈ S′, then
ϕ(B) = ϕ(B′).
This property reﬂects the backward induction principle, and so the justiﬁcation of our
IIA property in the dynamic setting may be more palatable than the the justiﬁcation of
the ordinary IIA in static framework. Note that TPIIA implies EPEP.
Next we introduce properties concerning time dimension of the problems.
Time Decomposability (TD). Let B = (S,a,T,r) and B′ = (S,a,T ′,r) with T > T ′.
Then ϕ(B) = ϕ(S,ϕ(B′),T − T ′,r).
TD states that the solution is decomposable along the time dimension too. The prob-
lems B and B′ are otherwise the same except that in B there is more time to bargain
(T > T ′). Then players could solve B′ ﬁrst, and use it’s solution as an outside alternative
in the new problem where the dead line is at T − T ′.
Next we formulate a symmetry property in our dynamic context. Let ˆ π be the nontrivial
permutation on {1,2, i.e., ˆ π(i) = j,i  = j. The induced permutation on R2 is denoted by
9π so that π(x1,x2) = (x2,x1) for any (x1,x2) ∈ R2. An element x ∈ R2 is symmetric if
π(x1,x2) = (x1,x2), and a set S ⊂ R2 is symmetric if π(S) = {π(x) | x ∈ S} satisﬁes
π(S) = S. A subset S ⊂ R2 is symmetric relative to a ∈ R2, if S − a is symmetric.
Dynamic Symmetry (DS). Given B = (S,a,T,r) ∈ Ψ, suppose S∩{x ∈ R2
+ | x ≥ a}
is symmetric relative to e−rta, for all t ≤ T. Then {f(B)} is symmetric relative to e−rta.
This requirement says that if relative symmetry holds all the way from the end phase
to the initial phase, then the solution is determined according to the translated symmetry
condition. The precondition in DS is rather demanding, but when it is satisﬁed this axiom
becomes very stringent. In fact it can be applied only to problems with linear Pareto
frontiers unless a itself is symmetric.
We state our result for any end phase evaluation compatible with properties listed
above. But for the sake of simplicity, we write down two more properties for the end phase
evaluation g.
Individual Rationality (IR). g(S,a) ≥ a.
Symmetry (Sym). If S −a is symmetric, then {g(S,a)} is symmetric with respect to
the point a.
Also, in order to extend the limit solution to problems with non-diﬀerentiable Pareto
frontiers, we have to extend our deﬁnition of the local Nash solution N to this class. This
causes no problems and we omit the details.
Theorem 2 Suppose that g satisﬁes E, Cont, SI, Sym, and IR. Given g, there is a unique
solution, ϕg, satisfying E, Cont., SI, TD, TPIIA, and DS which is given by ϕg(S,a,T,r) =




r{N1(z1,F(z1))−z1}dt if g(S,a)  = N∗(S),and ϕg(S,a,T,r) =
N∗(S) if g(S,a) = N∗(S).
Proof. It is clear that there are many mappings g satisfying E, Cont, SI, Sym and IR.
Given such a g, the solution ϕg given above is well deﬁned by Theorem 1. Let us show ﬁrst
that ϕg satisﬁes the axioms E, Cont, SI, TD, TPIIA and DS.
The axioms E and SI are clearly satisﬁed by ϕg. Let B = (S,a,T,r) ∈ Ψ be any
problem. Note that if a does not satisfy a1 = a2, then DS is applicable only if S is
symmetric with a linear Pareto frontier and ϕg clearly satisﬁes DS. Continuity of g implies
continuity of ϕg because the value of the integral deﬁning ϕg depends continuously on
g1(S,a), z1 and N1(z1,F(z1)). Let B′ = (S′,a′,T,r) be another problem that is related to
B as in the statement of TPIIA. Since g(S,a) = g(S′,a′) and the segment of the Pareto
frontier connecting g(S,a) to ϕg(B) is the same in both problems, TPIIA is satisﬁed. The
10axiom TD is satisﬁed because an integral is an additive function of its integration limits.
Therefore ϕg satisﬁes all the axioms.
Let ϕ be any solution satisfying axioms E, Cont, SI, TD, TPIIA and DS, given that
g satisﬁes axioms E, Cont, SI, Sym and IR. We have to show that ϕ = ϕg.
For a symmetric problem B with a linear Pareto frontier, we have ϕ(B) = ϕg(B) by DS
and E. By SI, the same result carries to all problems with a linear Pareto frontier. Then
consider any two problems B = (S,a,T,r) and B′ = (S′,a′,T,r) with the same end phase
evaluations, or g(S,a) = g(S′,a′), and with the same segment of the Pareto frontier joining
g(S,a) and ϕ(B). If this segment is a straight line segment, then TPIIA guarantees that
ϕ = ϕg.
Take then any problem B = (S,a,T,r) with the Pareto frontier consisting of two linear
pieces L1 and L2. If g(S,a) and ϕ(B) are in the same segment Li, then ϕ(B) = ϕg(B).
Suppose then that g(S,a) ∈ L1 and ϕ(B) ∈ L2. Let B′ = (S,a,T ′,r) and choose T ′,
0 < T ′ < T in such a way that ϕ(B′) ∈ L1 ∩ L2. That is, the solution ϕ(B′) of B′ is
precisely at the kink of the Pareto frontier of B. This can be done thanks to continuity of
ϕ. Applying TD we get ϕ(B) = ϕg(B). By induction, ϕ(B′′) = ϕg(B′′) for any problem
B′′ with the Pareto frontier consisting of ﬁnitely many linear pieces.
Let ﬁnally B = (S,a,T,r) ∈ Ψ be an arbitrary problem. There exists a problem B′ =
(S′,a,T,r) with a linear Pareto frontier supporting the Pareto set of B at g(S,a) = g(S′,a).
Given a natural number n > 0, one can ﬁnd a problem Bn = (Sn,a,T,r) within a distance
1/n (in the Hausdorﬀ metric) from B such that (i) the Pareto frontier of Bn of ﬁnitely
many linear pieces and (ii) the Pareto frontier of Bn is the same as the Pareto frontier
of B′ within a suﬃciently small neighbourhood of g(S,a). By the previous paragraph,
ϕ(Bn) = ϕg(Bn). By continuity, ϕ(B) = ϕg(B).
To single out our solution, we utilize axioms for g on Γ adopted by Salonen (1988).
Covariance (Cov). For any (S,a) ∈ Γ and a positive aﬃne transformation (α,β) of
payoﬀs, if (S′,a′) = ((α,β)S,(α,β)a), then g(S′,a′) = (α,β)g(S,a).
Independence of Individually Irrational Alternatives (IIIA). For all (S,a),
(S′,a) ∈ Γ, if S ∩ (a + R2
+) = S′ ∩ (a + R2
+), then g(S,a) = g(S′,a).
Given a problem (S,a) ∈ Γ, the ideal point M(S,a) ∈ R2
+ of (S,a) is deﬁned by
Mi(S,d) = max{yi | y ∈ S,y ≥ a},i = 1,2.
Weak Decomposability (WD). Let (S,a),(S′,a) ∈ Γ be any two problems such that
S ⊂ S′ and M(S,a) = M(S′,a). Then there is a problem (S
′′
,a) with M(S′′,a) = M(S,a)
such that g(S,a) = g(S,g(S′′,a)) and g(S′,a) = g(S′,g(S′′,a)).
11This property says that given any two problems with the same ideal points and outside
alternatives, one can ﬁnd a third problem with the same ideal point and outside option in
such a way, that the solution can be used as a new outside option for the ﬁrst two games
without changing their solution. One can easily see that WD is satisﬁed by the (discrete)
Raiﬀa solution R.
Lemma 3 (Salonen(1988)): There is a unique g which satisﬁes Sym, Cov, E, IIIA and
WD, which coincides with R.
Corollary 1 Suppose that g satisﬁes E, Cont, Cov, Sym, IIIA, and WD. Given g, the
unique solution ϕ satisfying E, Cont., SI, TD, TPIIA, and DS is ϕg, where g = R is the
Raiﬀa solution.
Apparently, if one wishes to derive the Nash bargaining solution as an end phase eval-
uation g, then requiring g to satisfy IIA (or its alternatives to characterize the Nash
bargaining solution; c.f. Dagan, Volij, and Winter (2002) and references therein) would
yield the desired result. Such a solution would be convenient for application as the solution
ϕg would be a sort of ”convex” combination of the Nash solution with respect to the best
alternative and the one with respect to the origin. As we mentioned earlier, the strategic
foundations of such a solution are not yet clear (except for the renowned Nash smoothing
argument (c.f. Nash (1953) and Van Damme (1987)).
All our results hold for n -person games as well. The main adjustement needed in the
proofs is that the integral should be replaced by a line integral in the formula of the limit
outcome.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the limit solution of the subgame perfect equilibrium of
the sequential bargaining game with a deadline. The solution represents the bargaining
outcome when players can exchange oﬀers and counteroﬀers inﬁnitely often within a limited
amount of time. The outcome can be represented by a formula implying that under the
random proposer protocol with an equal probability, the outcome is close to the Raiﬀa
solution when the deadline is imminent, which we refer to as an end phase evaluation, and
the solution tends toward the time preference Nash solution as the deadline is moved further
ahead. We also gave an axiomatic foundation for this solution with a strong symmetry
reqirement. Although one may obtain the Nash bargaining solution with respect to the
best alternative outcome as an end phase evaluation under the IIA, its strategic foundation
in line with the sequential bargaining game is yet to be found.
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